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1 BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
1 Civil No. 870180-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(c). The 
Defendants appeal a judgment rendered by the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Sevier County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, acting Circuit Court Judge, sitting without a jury. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Trial Court's findings are clearly erro-
neous and should be set aside. 
2. Whether, as a matter of law, the Plaintiff's negotia-
tion of an instrument with a restrictive endorsement consti-
tutes an Accord and Satisfaction. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Cove View Excavating & Construction Co. (Cove View) brought 
an action in the Tenth Circuit Court against D. Thomas Flynn 
and D. Thomas Flynn Construction (Flynn) for equipment services 
and rent. In defense, Flynn asserted that Cove View's claims 
were fully satisfied through an Accord and Satisfaction. The 
matter came before the Court, sitting without a jury, on the 
31st day of March 1987. The Court found no accord and satis-
faction and ruled in Cove View's favor. Flynn appeals that 
judgment. 
In the spring of 1984, Flynn was awarded a contract by the 
Utah Department of Transportation to perform certain bridge 
improvements on a public road in Sevier County, State of Utah. 
T.65. Because of the amount of water that spring, Flynn deter-
mined that the backhoe being used on the project was too small. 
Seeing Cove View's larger backhoe sitting near a service sta-
tion, Flynn aproached Mr. Wayne Grundy, president of Cove View, 
and inquired into the backhoe1s availability. T.66. Mr. Grundy 
is a general contractor like Flynn and has been in the business 
of heavy equipment for at least twenty (20) years. T.17. 
On or about May 4, 1984, the parties orally agreed that the 
backhoe would be used for a couple of days work at the rate of 
$125.00 per hour. In addition to the backhoe work, it was 
subsequently agreed that Flynn would rent one pump from Cove 
In addition to the backhoe work, it was subsequently agreed 
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that Flynn would rent one pump from Cove View at $35.00 per 
day and that Flynn would purchase 14 sheets of plyform at 
$10,00 per sheet. T.ll. 
There was no dispute that the backhoe was put to work on 
May 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15, 1984. There was also no dispute that 
the pump was in operation beginning May 8, 1984 and that it 
was removed from the project on June 14, 1984. There was, 
however, differing testimonies as to whether or not Cove View's 
billing for the backhoe work and pump rental was excessive. 
Cove View testified that its May 25 billing correctly showed 
4l£ hours as the number of hours the backhoe was used. T.10. 
Over Flynn's objection, Cove View offered the records of the 
Utah Department of Transportation as evidence of Cove View's 
claim for the items billed. The State Inspector testified that 
that he was not one of the parties to the agreement and that he 
had no knowledge as to how many hours noted on the State's 
records can be attributed to Cove View's backhoe. T.51. Flynn 
testified that the correct hours should have been 28, as is 
reflected by Flynn's daily logs. T.68. Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 
and 6. Flynn also testified that the pump broke down and that 
by June 1, 1984 Cove View was told to take the pump back. 
Although it was anticipated originally that a bill would 
be sent at the end of the work, Cove View billed Flynn on May 
25, 1987 for the backhoe, and for the pump rent through May 25 
and for 14 sheets of plyform. Exhibit 13 (See addendum). 
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Flynn testified that because his records reflected $4,060.00 
as due instead of $5,922.50 as was billed, a check was sent in 
the amount of $5,000.00 as a compromise for the difference. 
Flynn therefore tendered the check with the following restric-
tive endorsement "Payment in full for all labor and materials 
to 6-26-84." T.82. (See addendum) In the meantime, Cove View 
sent its second billing for pump rental from May 25 to June 14, 
1984 and for costs to replace the seal in the pump. Exhibit 14. 
(See addendum) Upon receiving Flynn's check, Cove View sought 
advise from counsel and cashed the check after crossing through 
the restrictive endorsement. There was conflicting testimony 
as to whether the parties discussed Flynn's disagreement over 
the billing prior to sending the $5,000.00 check. T.31,96. 
Cove View subsequently brought the action below to collect 
what it felt was left owing. After hearing the evidence, the 
Court found that "just sending a check marked 'paid in full1, 
without there being an indicated dispute by either party, is 
not fair, nor proper..." T.118. The Court also found that a 
restrictive endorsement on a check for services has no effect 
and is "unfair " in being sent. T.119. The Court found that 
Flynn's payment was for an ongoing account and that there was 
not a meeting of the minds for settlement. Therefore, it 
ruled that there was no Accord and Satisfaction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Courts findings were induced by an erroneous view 
of the law and were not supported by the evidence. As a result, 
the Courts findings are in error and should be set aside. 
-5-
2. When a check is tendered as payment in full of an un-
liquidated claim, Cove View cannot disregard the condition 
attached to the check. It had the choice of accepting the 
check on Flynn's terms or of returning the check. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURTS FINDINGS ARE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND 
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
Rule 52(a) provides for the Trial Courts factual findings 
to be affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous. In the 
present case, the Trial Courts findings that led to the con-
clusion that the restrictive endorsement had no effect are 
clearly erroneous for the following reasons and should be set 
aside by this Court. 
1. The evidence does not support the findings. Although 
some of the basic terms of the parties agreement were not in 
dispute there was a dispute as to whether the hours billed by 
Cove View were excessive. The testimonies of Mr. Grundy, Mr. 
Flynn, and the State Inspector each led to a different con-
clusion as to what hours should have been billed. The Courts 
reliance on the State Inspector's testimony is particularly 
curious in light of the fact that the inspector testified that 
from his records he could not tell how many hours could be at-
tributed to Cove View's backhoe. 
There were conflicting testimonies as to whether there 
were discussions between the parties concerning Flynn's 
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disagreement over the hours billed. Even if the Court believed 
Mr. Grundy's testimony that he was not made aware of a dispute 
on his billing prior to receiving the check, it cannot be con-
cluded that there was not a bonafide dispute. The fact that 
the dispute over the hours billed was not expressed to Cove 
View prior to receiving the check does not negate the fact that 
the hours billed did not agree with Flynn's record of Cove View's 
hours on the job. Furthermore, the restrictive endorsement 
itself led to the conclusion that a dispute existed. 
The Court's conclusion that the payment represented a pro-
gress payment also is not supported by the evidence. The 
parties had contracted for this project only. The backhoe 
work was completed by May 15 and the pump was removed from the 
property on June 14. It was the parties understanding that the 
bill would be sent at the end of the project, which originally 
was anticipated to conclude before the end of the month of May. 
Cove View's election to invoice at the end of the month does not 
have the effect of making Flynn's payment a progress payment. 
Such an effect jeopardizes what the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized as a convenient and valuable means of achieving in-
formal settlements as Flynn sought to do here. See Marton Re-
modeling, infra. All a creditor would have to do to defeat 
the defense of Accord and Satisfaction, is to send an invoice 
each month to each debtor, thereby causing every payment sent 
"in full satisfaction" to be construed as a progress payment. 
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In addition, the restrictive endorsement clearly set forth the 
condition that the cashing of the check would be full satis-
faction for all labor and materials rendered through 6-26-84, 
well after all work and materials were completed and taken 
from the project. 
2. Records of the State Inspector were improperly admitted 
over Flynnfs objection. Rule 602 of the Rules of Evidence state 
that a witness may not testify to a matter unless there is 
evidence that he has personal knowledge of the matter. In 
the present case, the testimony of the State Inspector 
was offered to prove the correctness of Cove View's billing. 
The State Inspector testified that he was not a party to the 
contract and did not know what portion of his records reflected 
Cove View's backhoe. Because the inspector did not have per-
sonal knowledge as to the contract or as to what his records 
represented, the Records of the Utah Department of Transportation 
should not have been admitted into evidence to prove Cove View 
claimed performance and the Court's reliance thereon should be 
set aside. 
3. The findings were based on an erroneous view of the 
law. The Court stated its view several times that to just send 
a check, without indicating a dispute prior to sending it, as 
it obviously felt Flynn had done, was improper and unfair. 
This view is contrary to the view expressed in Marton Remodeling 
v. Jensen 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985). In Marton Remodeling, the 
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Court recognized the importance of a "payment in full" check 
as a convenient and valuable means of achieving informal settle-
ments. In reviewing the law, the Court quoted the following 
illustration: 
"A contracts with B to have repairs made on A's 
house, no price being fixed, B sends A a bill for 
$1,000.00. A honestly disputes this amount and sends 
a letter explaining that he thinks the amount exces-
sive and is enclosing a check for $800.00 as payment 
in full. B, after reading the letter, endorses the 
check and deposits it in his bank for collection. B 
is bound by an Accord under which he promises to 
accept payment of the check in satisfaction of A's 
debt for repairs. The result is the same if, before 
endorsing the check, B adds the words "Accepted under 
protest as part of payment". The result would be dif-
ferent, however, if B's claim were liquidated, undis-
puted, and matured." 
The present case is similar to the illustration just quoted. 
Instead of sending the check with a letter explaining the check 
as payment in full, Flynn sent a check which clearly explained 
itself as payment in full. The law does not regard such a 
procedure as improper and unfair. 
Furthermore, the Court in Marton Remodeling recognized 
that a "time and materials" contract of that class of trans-
action's gives rise to an "unliquidated claim". See 6 Corbin, 
Contracts §1787 (1962). The Court erred in finding that a check 
like Flynn's as payment for services was unfair. The Courts 
erroneous view of the law induced its findings that the re-
strictive endorsement had no effect. 
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II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE CASHING OF THE 
CHECK CONSTITUTED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
In Marton Remodeling, supra, the Utah Supreme Court recent-
ly addressed the common law rule on negotiating checks with 
restrictive endorsements . When a bonafide dispute arises 
and a check is tendered as full payment of a liquidated claim, 
the creditor may not disregard the condition attached. He 
either cashes the check accepting the condition, or he returns 
the check, See also 6 Corbin, Contracts (1962) §1277, 1279; 15 
Williston, Contracts (3d Ed. 1972) §1854; and 2 Restatement 
(Second) contracts (1981) §281, Comment d. The Court noted 
that an Accord and Satisfaction is not automatic every time a 
check is cashed while bearing the notatation "paid in full". 
There needs to be an unliquidated claim or a bonafide dispute 
over the amount due. In addition, payment must be tendered in 
full settlement of the entire dispute and cannot be given merely 
as a progress payment. 
For the reasons argued above, there was a bonafide dispute 
over the number of hours owed. The contract was not a fixed 
amount. Rather, it was for equipment and services at the rate 
of $125.00. Flynn disagreed with the number of hours billed 
and sent a check for a payment which he felt was a compromise. 
The check was noted as "payment in full for all labor and mat-
erials to 6/26/84." There was no question but that Flynn in-
tended the account with Cove View to have been paid in full. 
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Even if Cove View's contention that there was no discussion 
of dispute in accepted, the dispute became apparent once they 
received Flynn's check. Cove View was not taken advantage of 
in any way. Its President, Mr. Grundy, had been in this type 
of business for twenty (20) years and knew, or should have 
known, of this as an informal way to resolve a dispute which 
Flynn had with the billing. The check was sent after all work 
had been completed and all equipment removed from the project. 
The fact that the payment crossed in the mail with the second 
billing does not indicate the payment as a progress payment. 
Calculating the billing to be excessive, Flynn sent a check 
for an amount he felt would resolve all claims arising out of 
the relationship between the parties. 
Since there was a bonafide dispute, since payment was tend-
ered as payment in full for the entire contract, and since 
payment was not given merely as a progress payment, Cove View's 
cashing of the $5,000^00 check constituted an Accord and 
Satisfaction as a matter of law. It was Cove View's crossing 
through of Flynn's restrictive endorsement that, as a matter of 
law, had no effect. Cove View had the option to accept the check 
upon the condition noted thereon or of returning it to Flynn. 
Cove View cashed the check, thereby accepting it as payment 
in full for the obligations incurred by Flynn on the Serier 
County Project. 
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CONCLUSION 
The findings of the Court must be set aside and the judg-
ment reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of July, 1987. 
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MARTON REMODELING v. JENSEN 
Cite a* 706 ?2d 607 (Utah 1985) 
Utah 607 
subsection (g)(7), "the prosecution shall 
open the argument, the defense shall fol-
low and the prosecution may close by re-
sponding to the defense argument." Here, 
the prosecutor initially made a very brief 
statement of the case in his closing argu-
ment and reserved most of his time for 
rebuttal. Although this tactic may not 
have been what the defendant expected, it 
was not improper. As to closing argu-
ments, Rule 17 merely requires that the 
prosecution open closing argument and lim-
it rebuttal to only those matters argued by 
the defense. We find no error here. 
We have reviewed defendant's other 
claims of error and find them to be without 
merit. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., DURHAM and ZIMMER-
MAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
MARTON REMODELING, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Mark JENSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
MARTON REMODELING, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Mark JENSEN, Defendant and 
Respondent 
Nos. 18400, 18401. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 17, 1985. 
Builder sued to foreclose on mechan-
ic's lien on owner's house and lot for 
$6,538.12 which builder claimed was due 
for remodeling. Jury awarded $1,538 actu-
al damages, $1,000 punitive damages, and 
$5,950.24 attorney fees. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkin-
son, J., remitted award of punitive dam-
ages and reduced award of attorney fees to 
$2,976.12, and both parties appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that build-
er's cashing of $5,000 check containing con-
dition that "[endorsement hereof consti-
tutes full and final satisfaction," where 
bona fide dispute existed as to the amount 
owing, constituted an "accord and satisfac-
tion" that could not be altered by builder's 
addition of "not full payment" below condi-
tion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., dissented. 
1. Accord and Satisfaction ®=>11(2) 
Builder's cashing of $5,000 check, con-
taining condition that "[endorsement here-
of constitutes full and final satisfaction," 
where valid dispute existed as to amount 
owing, constituted "accord and satisfac-
tion" that could not be altered by builder's 
addition of "not full payment" below the 
condition. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Accord and Satisfaction <3=*11(1) 
Accord and satisfaction of single claim 
is not avoided merely because amount paid 
and accepted is only that which debtor con-
cedes to be due or that debtor's view of 
controversy is adopted in making settle-
ment. 
3. Accord and Satisfaction <s=ll(2) 
Where bona fide dispute arose as to 
amount owing and check was tendered by 
owner to builder in full payment of unliqui-
dated claim, the builder could not disregard 
the condition attached to check. 
4. Accord and Satisfaction <s=>l 
Common-law rules of accord and satis-
faction are not altered by U.C.A.1953, 70A-
1-207. 
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B. Ray Zoll, Salt Lake City, for Marton. 
Peter M. Ennenga, Midvale, for Jensen. 
HOWE, Justice: 
These appeals are from a judgment en-
tered in an action brought by the plaintiff, 
Marton Remodeling, to foreclose a mechan-
ic's lien which it had filed against a house 
and lot owned by the defendant, Mark Jen-
sen, for $6,538.12 which it claimed was due 
it for remodeling. Judgment was entered 
on a jury verdict for $1,538, together with 
$1,000 punitive damages, and attorney fees 
of $5,950.24. The trial court remitted the 
award of punitive damages and reduced the 
attorney fees by 50 percent to $2,976.12. 
Jensen appeals from that judgment in case 
No. 18400, and in case No. 18401, Marton 
appeals, seeking to reinstate the award of 
punitive damages and recover the full 
amount of attorney fees awarded by the 
jury. 
Jensen engaged Marton Remodeling in a 
"time and materials" contract to remodel 
his house. When Marton presented the 
final bill for $6,538.12, Jensen contended 
that the number of hours claimed was ex-
cessive. He offered to pay $5,000 because 
he considered the services were worth that 
amount, but Marton refused the offer. 
Nevertheless, Jensen sent Marton a $5,000 
check with the following condition placed 
thereon: "Endorsement hereof constitutes 
full and final satisfaction of any and all 
claims payee may have against Mark S. 
Jensen, or his property, arising from any 
circumstances existing on the date hereof." 
Marton wrote a letter to Jensen refusing to 
accept the check in full payment and de-
manded the balance. When Jensen made 
no further payment, Marton filed a me-
chanic's lien on Jensen's property and 
cashed the check after writing "not full 
payment" below the condition. This action 
was then brought by Marton to recover the 
$1,538 balance plus punitive damages and 
attorney fees. 
[1] Jensen contends that the trial court 
erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his 
favor because, as a matter of law, Marton's 
cashing of the $5,000 check constituted an 
accord and satisfaction that could not be 
altered by the words added to the condition 
placed thereon by Jensen. We agree. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Marton Remodeling, there was 
an accord and satisfaction as we have de-
fined that term in the previous cases decid-
ed by this Court. See Sugarhouse Fi-
nance Co. v. Anderson, Utah, 610 P.2d 
1369 (1980); Tates, Inc. v. Little America 
Refining Co., Utah, 535 P.2d 1228 (1975); 
Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 
18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966); Ralph 
A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & 
Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669 
(1938); Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 
P.2d 1073 (1935). 
Marton asserts that there was not an 
accord and satisfaction because Marton 
was unquestionably entitled to the $5,000 
represented by the check, and the only 
dispute was whether any further amount 
was owing. He cites Bennett v. Robin-
son's Medical Mart, Inc., supra, in support 
of that reasoning. That reliance is mis-
placed because that case did not involve a 
single claim as in the instant case. In 
Bennett, a salesman who was paid only 
commissions on sales made by him was put 
on a fixed monthly salary by his employer. 
When he terminated his employment two 
months later, he demanded payment of his 
fixed monthly salary then due him plus 
unpaid commissions on sales allegedly 
made by him prior to the change. He also 
sought reimbursement of stock payments. 
His employer gave him a check for the 
amount of the fixed monthly salary then 
due him, which he cashed, bearing the 
statement that it was "payment in full of 
the account stated below—endorsement of 
check by payee is sufficient receipt." This 
Court viewed the salesman as having two 
claims: one for his fixed monthly salary 
which was not in dispute and another claim 
for his commissions about which there was 
a dispute. The amount of the check cover-
ed only the fixed monthly salary and did 
not purport to relate to the claim for com-
missions. We held that the plaintiffs cash-
MARTON REMODELING v. JENSEN 
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mg of the check in those circumstances 
could not constitute an accord and satisfac-
tion of the claim for commissions. We 
cited Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 
13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962), which 
also involved two claims, in support of our 
decision. The Alaska Supreme Court in 
Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, Alaska, 673 
P.2d 774 (1983), held that a single claim, 
including both its disputed and undisputed 
elements, is unitary and not subject to divi-
sion so long as the whole claim is unliqui-
dated. 
Marton is not aided by Allen-Howe Spe-
cialties v. U.S. Construction, Inc., Utah, 
611 P.2d 705 (1980). There, the cashing of 
a check representing a progress payment 
on a contract was held not to be an accord 
and satisfaction of all amounts owing up to 
that time. At the time the progress pay-
ment was made, there was no dispute and, 
unlike the instant case, it was not tendered 
as the last payment of the contract where 
finality and settlement is usually sought 
and intended. 
[2] Thus, neither of those cases is dis-
positive here where we are confronted with 
a single unliquidated claim, viz., the bal-
ance owing on a "time and materials,, con-
tract Instead, the general rule applies, 
which is that an accord and satisfaction of 
a single claim is not avoided merely be-
cause'the amount paid^and accepted is only 
that which the debtor concedes to be due or 
that his j iew of the controversy is adopted 
in making_the settlement. Air Van Lines, 
Inc. v. Buster, supra; North American 
Union v. Montenie, 68 Colo. 220, 189 P. 16 
(1920); Stanley-Thompson Liquor Co. v. 
Southern Colorado Mercantile Co., 65 
Colo. 587, 178 P. 577, 4 A.L.R. 471 (1919); 1 
CJ.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 32 
(1936). Corbin on Contracts § 1289 ap-
proves the rule and states that it is sup-
ported by the greater number of cases, 
citing as good examples Miller v. Prince 
Street Elevator Co., 41 N.M. 330, 68 P.2d 
663 (1937), Treat v. Price, 47 Neb. 875, 66 
N.W. 834 (1896), and Fuller v. Kemp, 138 
N.Y. 231, 33 N.E. 1034 (1893). 
[3] It is of no legal consequence that 
Marton told Jensen upon receipt of the 
$5,000 check that he did not regard it as 
payment in full. Marton could not dis-
regard with immunity the condition placed 
on the check by Jensen by writing "not full 
payment" under the condition. It is true 
that there is not an automatic accord and 
satisfaction every time a creditor cashes a 
check bearing a "paid in full" notation. 
^Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125 P. 
412 (1912). An accord and satisfaction re-
quires that there be an unliquidated claim 
or a bona fide dispute over the amount due. 
Ashton v. Skeen, supra. Payment must 
be tendered in full settlement of the entire 
dispute and not in satisfaction of a sepa-
rate undisputed obligation, as in Bennett v. 
Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., supra. 
Payment cannot be given merely as a 
progress payment, as in Allen-Howe v. 
U.S. Construction, Inc., supra. However, 
when a bona fide dispute arises (the exist-
ence of which Marton does not dispute in 
this appeal) and a check is tendered in full 
payment of an unliquidated claim as we 
have here, arising out of a "time and mate-
rials" contract, the creditor may not dis-
regard the condition attached. Corbin on 
Contracts § 1279 explains: 
The fact that the creditor scratches out 
the words "in full payment," or other 
similar words indicating that the pay-
ment is tendered in full satisfaction, does 
not prevent his retention of the money 
from operating as an assent to the dis-
charge. The creditor's action in such 
case is quite inconsistent with his words. 
It may, indeed, be clear that he does not 
in fact assent to the offer made by the 
debtor, so that there is no actual "meet-
ing* of the minds." But this is merely 
another illustration of the fact that the 
making of a contract frequently does not 
require such an actual meeting. 
(Footnote omitted.) Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 281 is to the same effect 
and provides the following illustration: 
6. A contracts with B to have repairs 
made on A's house, no price being fixed. 
B sends A a bill for $1,000. A honestly 
disputes this amount and sends a letter 
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explaining that he thinks the amount ex-
cessive and is enclosing a check for $800 
as payment in full. B, after reading the 
letter, indorses the check and deposits it 
in his bank for collection. B is bound by 
an accord under which he promises to 
accept payment of the check in satisfac-
tion of A's debt for repairs. The result 
is the same if, before indorsing the 
check, B adds the words ''Accepted un-
der protest as part payment." The re-
sult would be different, however, if B's 
claim were liquidated, undisputed and 
matured. 
(Citation omitted.) See Miller v. Prince 
Street Elevator Co., supra, Wilmeth v. 
Lee, Okla., 316 P.2d 614 (1957), and Graf 
fam v. Geronda, Me., 304 A.2d 76 (1973), 
for cases where it was held that a creditor 
cannot avoid the consequences of his exer-
cise of dominion by a declaration that he 
does not assent to the condition attached 
by the debtor. The last cited case succinct-
ly stated the law to be, "The law gave the 
plaintiffs the choice of accepting the check 
on defendant's terms or of returning it." 
[4] Marton contends that under U.C.A,, 
1953, § 70A-1-207, it avoided the condition 
placed on the check by Jensen when it 
added the words "not full payment." Mar-
ton asserts that those were words of reser-
vation of rights recognized by section 70A-
1-207. Without deciding whether the 
wording added by Marton could be so inter-
preted, no authority is cited by Marton that 
section 70A-1-207 applies to a "full pay-
ment" check. Of the authorities which we 
have found, the better reasoned hold that 
our section 70A-1-207 (which is identical to 
section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code) does not alter the common law rules 
of accord and satisfaction. See Flambeau 
Products Corp, v. Honeywell Information 
Systems, Inc., 116 Wis.2d 95, 341 N.W.2d 
655 (1984); R.A. Reither Construction, 
Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Electric Associa-
tion, Colo.App., 680 P.2d 1342 (1984); 
Stultz Electric Works v. Marine Hydrau-
lic Engineering Co., Me., 484 A.2d 1008 
(1984); Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, su-
pra; Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon, 
Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or.App. 364, 
664 P.2d 419 (1983); Connecticut Printers, 
Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal.App.3d 
54, 184 Cal.Rptr. 436 (1982); Milgram 
Food Stores, Inc. v. Gelco Corp., 550 
F.Supp. 992 (W.D.Mo.1982); Pillow v. 
Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, 6 Ark. 
App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982); Eder v. 
Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., Fla.App., 
407 So.2d 312 (1981); Chancellor, Inc. v. 
Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 NJ.Super. 
345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980); Brown v. Coast-
al Trucking, Inc., 44 N.C.App. 454, 261 
S.E.2d 266 (1980); State Department of 
Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash.App. 
671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980); and Jahn v. 
Burns, Wyo., 593 P.2d 828 (1979) (noted 
with approval in Recent Developments in 
Utah Law, 1980 Utah L.Rev. 649, 710); 
Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction: 
Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 78 Colum.L.Rev. 48 (1978)). 
Several courts have stated that if they 
were to construe the statute to limit accord 
and satisfaction, it would jeopardize a con-
venient and valuable means of achieving 
informal settlements. Les Schwab Tire 
Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, 
Inc., supra. The law favors compromise in 
order to limit litigation. Accord and satis-
faction serves this goal. Air Van Lines, 
Inc. v. Buster, supra. As stated by Judge 
Corbm in Pillow v. Thermogas Co. of Wal-
nut Ridge, supra, "If we were to decide 
that a creditor can reserve his rights on a 
'payment in full' check, it would seriously 
circumvent what has been universally ac-
cepted in the business community as a con-
venient means for the resolution of dis-
agreements." 
Our determination that there was an ac-
cord and satisfaction obviates the necessity 
of our consideration of any of the other 
points raised in either appeal. The judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff is reversed, 
and the case is remanded to the trial court 
to enter judgment in favor of the defend-
ant. Costs on appeal are awarded to de-
fendant. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
